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Abstract
In recent years multiple novel influenza A strains have emerged in humans. We reviewed publically available data
to summarise epidemiological characteristics of distinct avian influenza viruses known to cause human infection
and describe changes over time. Most recently identified zoonotic strains have emerged in China (H7N9, H5N6,
H10N8) – these strains have occurred mostly in association with visiting a live bird market. Most zoonotic AIVs and
swine influenza variants typically cause mild infections in humans however severe illness and fatalities are
associated with zoonotic H5N6, H10N8, H7N9 and H5N1 serotypes, and the H1N1 1918 Spanish Influenza. The
changing landscape of avian influenza globally indicates a need to reassess the risk of a pandemic influenza
outbreak of zoonotic origin.
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Background
Following the emergence of the zoonotic influenza A
H5N1 in humans in 1997, Hong Kong, there was global
concern that the virus would evolve to become capable
of human to human transmission causing a pandemic
similar to the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic which killed
over 50 million people [1]– this concern stemmed from
the high case fatality rates (CFR) and absence of natural
herd immunity to the H5 hemagglutinin (HA).
Most high-level international activity has been focused
on global pandemic preparedness and how to manage
emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) once they have oc-
curred – in recent years there has been a shift in focus
in pandemic planning to prevent zoonotic infections at
the level of the species jump to eliminate the potential
for zoonotic transmission before the pathogen can estab-
lish itself in humans. Jones et al. (2008) [2] provide key
research on this subject. The authors compiled a com-
prehensive listing of all EID events in humans from
1940 to 2004 to identify drivers of infectious disease
emergence. The study predicted that most zoonotic EID
events are correlated with human population density
and growth and latitude, rather than areas with abun-
dant wildlife species. However, only one of the 335 iden-
tified global EID events was an influenza A virus (the
H5N1 subtype). In recent years multiple novel reassor-
tant influenza A viruses have emerged: H5N6 in 2014,
H7N9, H10N8 and H6N1 in 2013, and a novel H1N2
swine-flu variant in 2012.
We previously compared the novel H7N9 which
emerged in humans in Shanghai, 2013 to the more ex-
tensively studied H5N1 and highlighted some puzzling
differences in the epidemiology [3]. In this brief report,
we compared the epidemiology and emergence of all in-
fluenza A serotypes known to cause human infections.
The aim of this report is to identify trends or changes in
the epidemiology and characteristics of zoonotic influ-
enza A emergence in humans over time.
Methods
For all zoonotic avian influenza virus AIV serotypes ex-
cept H5N1 and H7N9 (for which methods have been
previously described ([3]), we reviewed epidemiological
features of outbreaks or cases. We searched publications
using the Scopus database, and grey literature using the
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World Health Organisations (WHO), Centres for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), Flutrackers and ProMed
websites, using the subtype as the keyword. Materials were
limited to those which were published in the English
language. Publications from Scopus were searched in
February to March 2015 (and again in August to September
2016) for relevant studies. Publications were not limited by
study design or year of publication. We retrieved all articles
with the subtype (e.g. “H5N6” or “H9N2”) in the title and
identified relevant articles through scanning titles, and then
abstracts. Further relevant studies were identified by exam-
ining the reference lists of relevant articles.
We extracted information on year and country of inci-
dence, characteristics of person/s affected (sex, age, occupa-
tion), clinical signs, mortalities, details of animal exposure
and pathogenic classification of virus. Highly pathogenic
(HPAI) outbreaks in poultry typically cause acute, severe
mortalities and have significant economic implications due
to the severe control measures (e.g. mass culling, disinfec-
tion, quarantine and movement restrictions) imposed
following outbreaks. Low pathogenic (LPAI) outbreaks in
poultry occur more commonly, have less clinical signifi-
cance, and are harder to detect. Extracted information
is provided in Additional file 1: Table S1, last updated
September 2016.
Details of individual outbreaks and isolated cases were
not extracted for non-zoonotic influenza A strains which
have caused human infections (seasonal and pandemic
influenzas), as it is outside the scope of this study to record
details on the enormous amount of human influenza cases,
and their epidemiology have been detailed extensively in
previous review articles [1, 4]. Similarly, extensive re-
views of swine influenza cases have already been pub-
lished elsewhere [5, 6].
We summarised features of all human and zoonotic
serotypes of influenza A which have been documented
to cause human infections (Table 1, last updated September
2016) and produced a timeline of the emergence of influ-
enza A serotypes in humans starting from the 1918
Spanish flu pandemic (Fig. 1). The emergence of variant
strains of H3N2, H1N2, and H1N1 were treated as sep-
arate emergent events. Figure 1 was created using IBM
SPSS Statistics for Windows (v22.0).
Results
Genetically distinct influenza A reassortants have emerged
in humans on a total of 19 separate occasions since 1918.
Of these, 6 strains are able to be efficiently transmitted
from human-to-human, 10 are predominantly zoonotic
AIVs, and 3 are predominantly zoonotic swine influenza
variants.
The rate of novel strains emerging in humans has in-
creased in recent years (Fig. 1). In the past 5 years alone, 4
novel subtypes and 3 novel variant strains have emerged
in humans. A total of 14 different HA-NA combinations
are known to cause human infections, with H1N1, H1N2,
and H3N2 HA-NA combinations emerging multiple times
since 1918 (Table 1). Zoonotic AIVs are mostly of the
LPAI type (8 of 10).
Swine influenza variant viruses (H3N2v, H1N1v,
H1N2v,) have all emerged in humans in the United
States (US) in July 2011, December 2011 and June 2012
respectively (see Table 1), and subsequent occurrences
have largely been restricted to the US and Canada. After
the first zoonotic AIV human infection was reported in
the US in 1979, emergence of zoonotic AIVs have been
reported from the US and Canada (n = 3), Australia (n =
1) and Hong Kong (n = 2) and from 2013, all novel AIVs
have emerged in different geographic regions in China
(n = 3) and Taiwan (n = 1).
Human infections which have been associated with ani-
mal environments have been predominantly linked to a
production animal species (mostly swine or avian), whilst
infections caused by exposure to pets, wild animals, or la-
boratory animals have rarely been documented. In devel-
oped countries (North America, Europe and Australia),
human cases were linked to poultry farms (112/129 cases
were linked to poultry farms, 15/129 did not report details
regarding exposures, 1/129 report of a laboratory ex-
posure and 1/129 report of a pet animal exposure –
see Additional file 1: Table S1 for details).
Human cases of AIV infection have typically in the
past been exposed to virus via infected poultry on farms
or markets, however in recent years, and particularly in
China, occurrence of human infection have largely been
in association with visiting live bird markets (LBMs)
rather than close contact with poultry [7]. However, ex-
posure details are missing for a large proportion of cases
(see Additional file 1: Table S1 and [3, 7]). We have
shown that a history of close poultry contact is far more
common for human H5N1 cases than H7N9 cases [7].
In the latter case, a history of incidental poultry contact
(such as walking through LBMs) is more common [7].
The reason for this difference in risk factor profile is
unclear.
All zoonotic influenza infections have typically oc-
curred infrequently, in a sporadic pattern typical of ani-
mal to human transmission without sustained human to
human transmission ensuing. However there are few in-
cidences of larger scale outbreaks which have presented
with more cases than would be expected in sporadic
transmission: (i) large numbers of H7N9 human cases
have occurred each year since it’s emergence in 2013
(159 cases in 2013, 334 cases in 2014, 210 cases in 2015
and 99 cases in 2016 [8], (ii) the H5N1 outbreak in
Egypt from 2014 to 2015 which caused 114 cases [9],
and (iii) H7N7 outbreak in the Netherlands in 2003
which caused 89 cases [10]. H7N9 infections were



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Bui et al. Archives of Public Health  (2017) 75:15 Page 4 of 7
mainly identified or reported during winter months – in
2014 and 2016 most infections (51% and 32% respect-
ively) occurred in January, in 2015 most infections (42%)
occurred in February, however in 2013 most infections
(64%) occurred in April (early spring) [8].
Most zoonotic AIVs (6 of 10) and all 3 swine influenza
variants typically cause mild infections in humans (see
Table 1). Severe illness and fatalities are associated with
only four zoonotic AIVs: high death rates have been re-
ported for human infections with H5N6 (9/15 cases, 60%),
H10N8 (2/3 cases, 67%), H7N9 (314/791 cases, 40%), and
H5N1 (449/850, 53%). Mild illness is associated with in-
fections in children – mild illness was seen for most
H9N2 infections (which has a young average age of infec-
tion in humans) and for the only two cases of young chil-
dren infected with H5N6 (aged 5 and 11). For H7N9 as
well, young children presented with only mild infections,
with more severe disease seen in older adults.
Discussion
We have shown an increase in emergence of AIVs
infecting humans in the last decade. There are several
reasons which likely explain this trend: (i) improvements
in zoonotic AIV case ascertainment, and (ii) a “true” in-
crease in AIV emergence, which could be explained by
an increase in AIV circulation and diversity in poultry pop-
ulations, growths in the poultry industry, and increased
human urbanisation.
Advances in influenza diagnostics and surveillance
capabilities, as well as increased clinician awareness (par-
ticularly following the emergence and continued sea-
sonal occurrence of H7N9), have likely contributed to
better ascertainment of influenza A in humans in China.
In the past, AIV reporting have likely been hindered in-
dustry and government pressure – in 1994 for example,
after H9N2 was discovered in humans in China, further
investigations were discouraged by Chinese government
officials [11]. In contrast, China’s rapid and transparent
response to the emergence of H7N9 in 2013 was widely
praised by international communities. A recognised cav-
eat however is the under ascertainment of subclinical
cases: predominantly, only patients with signs and symp-
toms, or severe disease, present to the health system and
a large proportion of cases with subclinical infection
may remain unreported. A bias in the reporting of se-
vere cases indicates that our reported CFRs are likely to
be inflated. This study also finds zoonotic swine influ-
enza viruses are more apparent in the US. However,
China is the largest global producer of swine (the US is
the second largest producer). Case ascertainment dispar-
ities likely explain this trend also; as there are stronger
surveillance systems in the US compared to China.
This study find there have not been any reports of AIV
emergence in humans in low-income, developing coun-
tries – this may also be due to case ascertainment bias.
Developing countries are both unable to support high
levels of active AIV surveillance (in both human and ani-
mal sectors), and highly regulated agricultural systems
with the ability to enforce disease control regulations. Fur-
ther, poor biosecurity measures at the human-animal
interface are common in these countries, which allow for
virus to more easily transmit to humans. In recent
years, several countries in west and central Africa experi-
enced a resurgence of H5N1 poultry outbreaks: Cameroon,
Burkina Faso, Niger, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and
Nigeria (in these countries reports of H5N1 outbreaks had
last occurred in 2006 – 2009) [8]. There is a concern
poultry outbreaks in these regions could escalate and
cause large numbers of human infections, similar to
the 2014–2015 Egypt outbreak [9]. We recommend
pandemic preparedness activities focus on improving
AIV control measures in developing countries.
The increase in AIV emergence in humans may also
be a reflection of increased AIV persistence and diversity
in poultry. Following the expansion of the poultry indus-
try from the mid-1980s (particularly in China and some
other Asian countries) a broad range of AIV lineages
have evolved to circulate among domestic poultry spe-
cies [12]. Prior to the emergence of H5N1 in the 1990s,
all other AIV strains which caused severe outbreaks in
poultry were able to be eliminated through standard
control measures. This was largely due to the insufficient
Fig. 1 Timeline of Influenza A serotype emergence by year and zoonotic host from 1918 to 2015. Each point indicates a distinct avian influenza
serotype known to have caused human infection, placement of point corresponds to their year of emergence. The different point shapes correspond to
the animal host which was identified when the serotype was first reported in humans: a pentagon corresponds to a seal host, a triangle corresponds to
avian host, a cross corresponds to swine host, and a circle corresponds to instances where the animal host has not yet been identified
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number of available animal hosts to sustain an outbreak.
It is critical to target control measures in regions with
high poultry population growth to prevent correspond-
ing growth of AIV reservoirs in this host population.
The extent of global AIV persistence and diversity may
also be reflected by recently described uncharacteristic
AIV outbreaks in animals. For example in high-income
countries HPAI incursions have traditionally been quickly
contained and eliminated through standard disease elim-
ination protocols, however in 2014 and 2015 HPAI caused
unprecedented numbers of outbreaks in commercial
poultry farms in the US, and similar outbreaks have oc-
curred in Europe in the past year [8]. AIV transmission in
domestic pets are considered to be rare, mild and unsus-
tainable however in November 2016, LPAI H7N2 was
found to cause an outbreak in 45 domestic kittens causing
one fatality [13]. These events indicate a need to re-
evaluate where risk of zoonotic AIV emergence is likely.
Increasing urban and agricultural encroachment into
previously uninhabited areas, particularly in developing
countries, may also play a role in promoting AIV trans-
mission to humans and domestic animals from wild bird
reservoir hosts. Wild migratory birds (largely from the
Anseriformes and Charadriiformes families e.g. ducks,
geese, gulls, waders and terns) are thought to be the
traditional hosts of AIVs and require use of wetlands
and lakes for breeding and wintering. Reduction of these
natural habitats for wild birds and can result in birds
using agricultural or urbanised areas, promoting inter-
action with high density farming systems (such as poultry
and swine), and also humans. Such close interactions in-
crease the risk of AIV introduction, and zoonotic disease
transmission – we recommend AIV control programmes
in focus on preventing such interactions particularly in
African and Asian countries which are urbanizing rapidly.
Zoonotic AIV infections have been sporadically reported
in developed regions such as North America, Europe and
Australia, with the most recent report occurring in 2013
in Italy. All were caused by subtypes other than HPAI
H5N1. Previously it was thought that only H5 and H7 HA
types posed a significant pandemic risk, however strains
of other HA types (H9, H6 and H10 for example) have
been able to infect humans and have pandemic potential.
The inability to predict which AIV types can infect
humans, combined with sheer variety of AIVs circulating
in poultry, makes it challenging to focus pandemic pre-
paredness measures to specific strains. A good example is
the efforts in pandemic planning globally around H5N1
from 2005 to 2009, which assumed the next pandemic
would be H5 related. However, the pandemic which
emerged in 2009 was a completely different virus, unre-
lated to H5N1. Pandemic planning should instead incorp-
orate interventions to prevent the species jump and
emergence of a human pandemic strain of influenza.
Conclusion
We find there have been recent increases in the number
of reports of AIVs infecting humans, predominantly
from mainland China. We recommend pandemic pre-
paredness measures focus on preventing zoonotic dis-
ease emergence, specifically the strengthening of control
efforts to reduce (i) potential introductions of AIVs into
poultry populations, (ii) subsequent spread within the
poultry sector, and (iii) virus transmission at the human-
animal interface (particularly within LBMs). Regional
disparities should also be considered. Low-income coun-
tries which are undergoing rapid commercialisation of
their poultry sector are at highest risk of harbouring
AIVs, and are unlikely to detect nor adequately control
AIV spread.
Additional files
Additional file 1: Table S1. Epidemiological features of reported
outbreaks or isolate cases of distinct avian influenza serotypes. This is a
table showing the information we have collected on reported outbreaks
or isolate cases of distinct avian influenza strains. (DOCX 70 kb)
Additional file 2: Text 1. The following is the reference list for Table 1
and Additional file 1: Table S1. This is a list of references showing where
information was collected from – the number of the reference corresponds to
numbers in Table 1 and Additional file 1: Table S1. (DOCX 22 kb)
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